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Introduction
When discussing the realities of the future of our planet, it is imperative to consider what
weapons the conflicts of the future may be waged with. While man has long fought on land, sea,
and sky, future conflicts very well could be in space.
Given the potential for space conflict, states have begun developing space for military
purposes, requiring consideration on whether or not these operations should be permissible. The
exploration of space will continue to occur; the question remains whether it will be a competition
or a collaboration. The future of space is like all future endeavors: uncertain, and as such, the
United States would do well to hedge its bets and be prepared to embrace both, through a
combination of competition and cooperation to better its situation among the stars.
The first question to ask when considering this endeavor of exploration is whether an
arms race in space would be anticipated or desired. This is completely conditional upon the
actors that can initiate it, and by most indications, the current U.S. administration intends to do
so. The Trump administration has not only created a new Space Force but has declared there to
be a new space race. The administration has also recently withdrawn from the Open Skies
Treaty: a treaty that would best be bypassed through the utilization of reconnaissance satellite
platforms in space, as it pertains to the overflight of reconnaissance aircraft.1 Of course, while
Trump’s doctrine will direct American policy for the near future, the potential for a space race
will also be heavily guided by the actions of other nations. This primarily includes China as a top
competitor due to its technological advancements and current role within the Sino-American
great power competition.2 Within the United States, debates continue between those who follow
brown water doctrine–that space power ought to focus on the potential for warfare and general
order in outer space–and blue water doctrine–that space power ought to focus on supporting the
commercial use of space.3 This is allowed and encouraged by the SPACE Act of 2015, which
allows for commercial exploitation of space by Americans.4 These doctrines primarily compete
with one that supports a more cooperative space with global involvement, but the doctrine that
will prevail remains uncertain.
Competition
While the future of space is far from certain, there are benefits to investing into a modernday space race. America can benefit strategically from more advanced technological innovation
in a shorter period of time; from upgraded offensive and defensive military capabilities, and a
climate more suitable for strengthening the United States' relationship with its allies.
1

Jim Garamone, “Trump Signs Law Establishing U.S. Space Force,” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
December 20, 2019,
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2046035/trump-signs-law-establishing-usspaceforce/.; Mike Wall, “US Is in a New Space Race with China and Russia, VP Pence Says,” Space.com, Space, March
27, 2019, https://www.space.com/new-space-race-moon-mike-pence-says.html.; “The Open Skies Treaty at a
Glance,” Arms Control Association, May 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies.
2
Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs,
December 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/agegreat-power-competition.
3
Peter Garretson, “A Historic National Vision for Spacepower,” War on the Rocks, September 9, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/a-historic-national-vision-forspacepower/.
4
Kevin McCarthy, “Text - H.R.2262 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act,” November 25, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262/text.
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When examining a future space race, it is critical to examine the nature of the United
States’ prior military competition. On Earth's surface, the Cold War was a battle of power by
means of nuclear proliferation, espionage, and proxy wars. Above the stratosphere, the Space
Race was a challenge of scientific innovation. While tensions remained relatively high between
Cold War superpowers on the ground, the Space Race was much more competition than direct
conflict. This competition created a back-and-forth that pushed the United States to increase its
technological capabilities in order to stay ahead.5 Whether through the Strategic Defense
Initiative, better known as Star Wars, or through anti-satellite (ASAT) tests of the 80s, the U.S.
has striven to maintain an edge.6 This concept can translate into a contemporary space race as
well. More and more nations are capable of the technology of space travel than ever before,
allowing for a larger pool from which advancements can come from and in which competition
can occur. In a modern age where the ability of private companies in the space technology
market is comparable to, if not greater than, the state-run space programs, this is even more
apparent. These improvements not only mean better technology for government-run or funded
programs, but also better-performing, faster, lighter, and more compact technology in non-outer
space technology, due to the trickle-down effect of technology from the defense sector to the
private sector. The commercial competition also allows for innovation of technology that would
not have otherwise been created like ARPANET.7
This competition did not end with the Cold War however, as even the Obama
administration classified space strategy as contested, competitive, and congested, commonly
referred to as the three C’s. The trend of the past decade is a contested space filled with many
more space capable nations, increasing the congestion above the atmosphere and the stakes of an
ever-expanding space competition, or race. This take had a heavy emphasis on the competition of
space and has served the U.S. well in the past decade.8
This competition brings more than just economic benefits, however; American military
capabilities stand to benefit from a space race. However, despite its current importance, policy
makers are paying little regard to space policy. While the recent formation of the Space Force
has made strides toward making space more of a priority, the branch lacks the structure and
funding necessary to achieve its important goals of maintaining a leading role in space.9 A space
race could provide the necessary motivation on the part of policymakers to increase funding and
5

Charles D. Lutes et al., “Commercial Space and Spacepower,” Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected
Essays, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/spacepower.pdf
6
“Vought ASM-135A Anti-Satellite Missile,” March 14, 2016.
https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/198034/asm-135-asat/;
Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control,” INSS
Occasional Paper 30, Space Policy Series, Jan. 2000, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=487481.
7
“The Computer History Museum, SRI International, and BBN Celebrate the 40th
Anniversary of First ARPANET Transmission,” CHM, October 27, 2009,
https://computerhistory.org/press-releases/museum-celebrates-arpanet-anniversary/.
8
“2011 National Security Space Strategy- UNCLASSIFIED,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 2011,
https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummar
y_Jan2011.pdf, 1-3.
9
Keith Zuegel, “Funding Two Military Services - with the Resources for One - Risks Both,” Defense
News, May 19, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/19/funding-two-military-services-with-theresources-for-one-risks-both/.
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subsequently increase the capability of the Space Force. It is easy to see how a space race would
push forward military offensive capabilities, but most importantly, it would also aid the United
States’ defensive capabilities. This would mean better protection of U.S. satellites, which play an
important role in national security on the ground including communications, missile warning
systems, imagery surveillance, the GPS system, and weather monitoring, among other
capabilities.10
Other nations are surging forward in a quest to develop satellite killing technology to
close the gap to U.S. superiority with ASAT weapons. Russia has been pursuing recent ASAT
capabilities, including an airborne laser system able to target missile defense systems. China has
been training military units to utilize its ASAT missile systems, capable of attacking LEO (low
earth orbit) satellites.11 India has even tested its own kinetic kill vehicle last year, and is now
capable of producing more of the weapons that can take down satellites up to 1000 km above
Earth.12 Currently, the only kinetic capability for anti-LEO satellites that America possesses is
repurposing the AEGIS system intended to intercept ballistic missiles, which was tested in 2008
against a U.S. satellite.13 Without significant investment in satellite defense programs or better
purpose built ASAT programs for deterrence, the United States will not be adequately prepared
to tackle space.
Aside from improved technological capabilities, a space race would provide an ideal
climate for creating tighter diplomatic relations with American allies. While one could argue that
such an arms race would destroy any hope at global space cooperation, such a belief is
unfounded. Like it or not, competition in space has already begun and is unlikely to reduce in
any capacity as more contenders vie for more control. Currently, there are rising threats in space
from the Chinese and Russian governments that would be magnified through a space race. In
light of this, American allies would not only be willing to increase partnership with U.S. space
defense efforts, but also be willing to help enhance combined capabilities. Currently, the U.S.-led
Combined Space Operations Center currently works with close allies of Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and New Zealand, as well as cooperation with other NATO
allies. This cooperation can only increase with a larger and more rapidly increasing threat. While
space partnerships are already more developed between America and the other Five Eyes
nations–Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand–the U.S. can benefit by
developing its ties with other potential allies, such as the growing space power of India. India has
developed ASAT capabilities and already established itself as a space rival to China, making it a
prime candidate for partnership to combat Chinese aggression in space.14 Japan is another nation
whose existing partnerships with the United States, coupled with its existing space programs, can
10

Ibid.
Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,” DIA, January 2019,
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_
sm.pdf.
12
Rahul Udoshi, “Defexpo 2020: DRDO Says ASAT Weapon System Is 'Ready for Further Limited
Production',” Janes.com (Jane's Find unrivaled intelligence, consultancy and advertising solutions to the defence and
national security sectors.), February 7, 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/defexpo-2020-drdosays-asat-weapon-system-is-ready-for-further-limited-production.
13
Laura Grego, “The AntiSatellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System,”
2011, https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf, 2-3.
14
Sandra Erwin, “New Studies Provide Fresh Insights into the Escalating Space Arms Race,”
SpaceNews.com, April 4, 2019, https://spacenews.com/new-studies-provide-fresh-insightsinto-the-escalating-spacearms-race/.
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help to counter Chinese advances.15 These relationships in space can also have the effect of
increasing cooperation on Earth, as well as increasing the United States’ world standing.
Cooperation
While there are certainly positive aspects to a second space race, there are a plethora of
detractors as well. In all facets of geopolitical considerations, a space race could adversely affect
the United States by increasing tensions in the growing Great Power Conflict, costing exorbitant
amounts of capital; and most crucially it may not be a race that the United States can win.
There is a new era of great power competition sweeping over Earth.16 With an
increasingly belligerent Russia, a China with hegemonic aspirations, and nuclear proliferation by
a number of less stable regimes, the world is an increasingly volatile place to carry out
geopolitics. By starting a new arms race, not to mention one in a virtually unexplored domain,
one could hardly expect this volatility to decrease. During the Cold War nuclear arms and first
space race the world was under constant fear of a nuclear holocaust. By stoking the fears of
autocratic rivals in Russia and China that expect aggression from the U.S., the United States
would play increasingly into the hands of its adversaries by kicking off an arms race in space,
losing a credible claim to peacebuilding among allies and concerned third parties alike. Space
will very likely be weaponized at some point, however that does not necessitate a mad rush with
little concern for the environment, stability, and world peace in the process. Diplomatically
speaking, an arms race would be detrimental to U.S. credibility and would unnecessarily provoke
American adversaries.
The financial costs of a space race would be staggering, a sum that an already
overextended U.S. budget could ill afford to handle. By adding an additional domain to fund that
would dwarf air, sea, land, and cyber costs by countless zeros, it would add insult to injury on the
financial status of the country. Admittedly, the financial costs of the two races in the past were
not without benefits, with technology spanning a wide range of fields, including LEDs, memory
foam, and countless other innovations being developed through the funding of space exploration,
tech that may have never been developed otherwise.17 In the present moment, however, with
much of advanced dual-use technology being fulfilled by private ventures, a new space race
funded by taxpayers may not be necessary to accomplish technological innovation.18 Even if an
arms race is the only catalyst for progress and innovation, is it worth the potential conflict?
Finally, the last reason, and by far the most pertinent, is the fact that this arms race may
not be one the United States can win. China is a leading space power, one of only three countries
to place a man in space, and its massive state-run economy can subsidize space weaponization

15

Todd Harrison et al., “SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 - Aerospace Security,” Aerospace
Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 27, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL-min.pdf, 51.
16
Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs,
December 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/agegreat-power-competition.
17
“NASA Technologies Benefit Our Lives,” NASA, accessed May 21, 2020,
https://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2008/tech_benefits.html.
18
Stephen J. Markovich and Andrew Chatzky, “Space Exploration and U.S. Competitiveness,” Council on
Foreign Relations, September 10, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-uscompetitiveness.

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol1/iss1/6

4

Prentice and Waite: Combining Competition and Cooperation

5
with consummate ease compared to America’s buckling financial burden.19 By committing to
this race, the United States may very well be serving the same function that the Soviet Union did
with the space race and arms race, that of a slowly declining power being bled of what financial
capacity it had en route to a long term collapse. If the United States commits to this race, not
only could it very conceivably lose, but it might just ruin its status as a superpower for decades
or even centuries to come. By overemphasizing the Obama era three C’s doctrine of competition,
stated in an age where America had an unquestionable “overall edge in space capabilities” it is
easy to lose sight of the merits of cooperation. American technology is, for now, still the best in
the business, and to ensure this, safeguards must be put in place to disincentivize weaponization
in space, taking away the belligerent nations’ advantage.
Conclusion
One possible safeguard to prevent an arms race for space would be more treaties like the
Outer Space Treaty (1967) or the proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS)
resolution currently in the U.N.20 While historically these treaties have been opposed by the
United States and ardently pursued by nations such as Russia and China (who feared the United
States gaining a distinct advantage on future battlefield), the United States should look to these
treaties as an effort to stave off future concerns of the same variety. Barring a cataclysmic shift,
there is a very good possibility that the future of space belongs to China, as mentioned before.21
With this possibility, it would behoove the United States to either massively ramp up funding to
stay ahead of these adversaries (which is impossible) or try to mitigate its advantage by seeking
to disarm space permanently, as a way to use American terrestrial military advantage. With
stricter international constraints being placed on space, it can be left for science and commerce to
seek the betterment of mankind. Potentially there will be an additional space race to colonize
Mars or mine the Moon, but it will not be one of exorbitant defense spending in order to maintain
an advantage on Earth.
Irrespective of the results, America’s response to the space challenge of the next years
and decades will chart the course of the United States for the foreseeable future. While the
Obama administration had their three C’s, there are three new C’s to define the correct approach
to space: Combining Competition and Cooperation. The decision today to pursue space as a field
of cooperation, seeking mining of the Moon, colonization of Mars, and other feats as a global
endeavor, or to see space as the next battlefield between China and other great powers, will
certainly influence policy for years to come. By seeking a course of consolidation, pursuing
cooperation where possible and competition where advantageous, America can both ensure its
place on the world stage and remain a paragon of science in the 21st century.
19

Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States,”
Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 11, 2019,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China's%20Space%20Power%20 Goals.pdf), 2.
20
David C. DeFrieze, “Defining and Regulating the Weaponization of Space,” National
Defense University Press, July 1, 2014, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-ForceQuarterly74/Article/577537/defining-and-regulating-the-weaponization-of-space/; “Proposed Prevention of an Arms
Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty,” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, accessed May 21,
2020, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposedprevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/.
21
Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States,”
Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 11, 2019,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China's%20Space%20Power%20 Goals.pdf), 12.
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